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Articles
PROSECUTING PAST CIVIL RIGHTS CRIMES IN MARYLAND

By: John Maclean
TIme's glory is to calm contending kings,
To unmask falsehoods and bring truth to light ....
- William ShakespeareI

I. Introduction
On October 18, 1933, in Princess Anne, Maryland,
a mob of at least 500 white Eastern Shore residents gathered around the county jailhouse. 2 They cried out for 'justice." They wanted to see George Annwood, anAfrican
American male charged of attacking an eighty-one-year
old elderly white woman, punished.3 A fight ensued at the
jailhouse door; thirteen State Troopers were injured. 4
Overcome, officers failed to stop the stampede. s
The mob dragged Armwood from his cell to the
street. 6 They raised up his body and lynched him. 7 The
next day, Governor Albert Cabell Ritchie ordered the Attorney General of the State of Maryland to take charge
and lead the investigation. S With the aid of detectives from
Baltimore, several suspects were later arrested.9 One of
the suspects was a police officer. \0 However, no one was
ever charged or convicted in the death. I I Case closed. 12
Imagine - you are a prosecutor in Maryland with
enough evidence on the perpetrators ofthis crime to bring
the case to trial. Would you reopen the case seventy years
later and prosecute, knowing that you will face evidentiary
problems and possible public backlash?
Over the last twenty years, state prosecutors are increasingly addressing similar questions and, in some cases,
deciding to prosecute. \3 Maryland prosecutors could soon
face such decisions. In addition to the Annwood murder,
there are other unresolved civil rights crimes in Maryland's
past, including: (1) at least six deaths and 600 injuries during the 1968 Baltimore City riots; 14 (2) a non-fatal shooting ofapolice officer in 1967;15 and (3) a mob lynching in
1931. 16
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Aside from evidentiary hurdles, should Maryland
prosecutors try these cases, they will inevitably face issues ofpolitics. To be sure, prosecuting unresolved civil
rights cases would create its own niche of prosecutorial
rules and pitfalls in Maryland.

II. Should We Prosecute Unsolved Civil
Rights Crimes?
Legal scholars, historians and civil rights attorneys
differ on whether past unsolved civil rights crimes should
be prosecuted. Dr. Sylvia Bradley, former American
history professor at Salisbury University, argues that
crimes in the distant past, like the 1930s, should not be
prosecuted.1 7 According to Dr. Bradley, such prosecutions would revive animosity or racial dissent, which was
buried by progress during the civil rights movement and
through time. ls Further, Dr. Bradley suggests that more
recent civil rights crimes should be prosecuted as a matter ofcriminal justice and in light ofthe evidence specific
to the case, not as hostile response to racial acts committed in the past. 19
Other state civil rights leaders and historians disagree. Neil Duke, a Maryland attorney and NAACP
Baltimore Chapter First Assistant Vice-President, contends that past civil rights crimes should be prosecuted
without regard to negative feelings that may resurface. 20
In Mr. Duke's view, society needs to confront past
crimes in order to move forward. 21 Professor Sherrilyn
Ifill, an expert on 1930s civil rights crimes, agrees with
Mr. Duke.22 Professor I:fill asserts that since mass lynchings are crimes committed by many members of a community, they are crimes committed essentially by societyP According to Professor Ifill, society must reconcile its past problems to improve and understand present
circumstanceS. 24 Lastly, Cambridge Police Department
ChiefKenneth Malik opines that police officials should
investigate and prosecute these past crimes because they
are crimes, and, as such, all crimes should be followed
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through to closure.2s
Bradley, Duke, Ifill, and Malik raise fundamental issues relating to the vindication of past civil rights crimes.
Indeed, prosecuting such crimes should be undertaken if
there is enough evidence. Moreover, unresolved past civil
rights crimes are no different than any other crime and
should not be afforded special treatment to bypass the
criminal justice system. In addition, prosecuting the perpetrators ofthese crimes would serve as reinforcement to
minority groups that their rights would be heard by society and the criminal justice system. By prosecuting past
civil rights crimes, the criminal justice system, which is cast
in a shadow of distrust by many in the minority community, could demonstrate that it strives to serve their interests, not merely the interests of the wealthy, the few, and
the privileged.

III. Types of Evidence
As many law students may recall from their second
year oflaw school, th~re are two types of evidence: direct
and circumstantial. According to Black's Law Dictionary,
direct evidence is "evidence that is based on personal
knowledge or observation and that, iftrue, proves a fact
without inference or presumption. ''26 Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, "consists of proof of collateral
facts and circumstances from which the existence ofamain
fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience."27 Prosecutions of unresolved civil rights
crimes fall into three case scenarios: (1) the case against
the defendant will only involve direct evidence; (2) the
case will involve a combination ofdirect and circumstantial evidence; and (3) the case will involve only circumstantial evidence showing the defendant's guilt.

Cases in which prosecution occurs years after the
crimes were committed tend to use circumstantial evidence. 28 Indeed, lack of direct evidence could be a reason for not prosecuting these cases in the first place. 29
Naturally, state investigations conducted years after these
crimes occurred would more likely discover circumstantial evidence than direct evidence, which may have been
lost or destroyed. As a result, it is likely that prosecutors
would rely on circumstantial evidence, with a scant level

of direct evidence, to seek indictments and, thereafter,
successfully prosecute past civil rights cases.30 To be sure,
the United States Supreme Court held it is possible to
secure a conviction with only circumstantial evidence ofa
defendant's guilt,31 but it is uncommon that a case against
a defendant would only involve circumstantial evidence.
One conviction, however, stands out for its near total dependency on circumstantial evidence. In 1963, the
nation was stunned by the bombing of the Sixteenth
Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama in which
four young African American girls were killed and a number of other people injured as a result of a domestic terrorist attack by Klu Klux Klansman Robert Edward
Chambliss. 32 The church was destroyed. 33 The only
stained glass window in the church that remained in its
frame showed Christ leading a group oflittle children,34
but the face of Christ was blown out. 3S Presidentlohn F.
Kennedy, yachting offNewport, Rhode Island, was notified by radiotelephone almost immediately and Attomey
General Robert F. Kennedy ordered Burke Marshall to
Binningham.36 Within days, at least twenty-five FBI agents,
including bomb experts from Washington, were sent to
investigate the bomb scene. 37
Despite substantial federal and local resources, the
State of Alabama indicted Chambliss in September of
1977. 38 As the appellate court noted, by that time, the
case against Chambliss was largely circumstantial.39 The
prosecutor's office relied on statements and conduct by
Chambliss evidencing his anger and racism towardsAfricanAmericans (i.e., his membership in the Klu Klux Klan),
his knowledge of bomb making, and a conversation with
his niece a day before the bombing in which he stated that
"he had enough stuffput away to flatten half of Binningham" and "[y]oujust wait until after Sunday morning, and
they will beg us to let them segregate ... just wait ... [ylou
will see. "40 More damning, however, was a statement
made in the presence ofhis niece on the Saturday evening
following the bombing.41 According to Chambliss' niece,
a television broadcast mentioned the likelihood of murder
charges stemming from the bombing and that Chambliss
responded, "It wasn't meant to hurt anybody. It didn't go
offwhen it was supposed to."42 Additionally, Ms. Gertrude
Glenn testified for the State and said that she saw
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Chambliss' automobile parked on Seventh Avenue North
behind and across an alley from the church at two 0' clock
on the morning ofthe explosion. 43 No one, though, saw
Chambliss at the crime scene moments prior to or after
the bombing. Nevertheless, Chambliss was convicted for
the murders in 1977 and died in jail eight years later at the
age of eighty-one. 44
Affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court
emphasized, "As we have indicated this case is based on
circumstantial evidence. Appellant did not testify. The
evidence presented by the State [is uncontradicted]."45
Moreover, the court noted, "Where the State relies upon
circumstantial evidence for a conviction testimony may
permissibly take a wide range and any fact from which an
inference may be drawn is competent evidence. "46
While Chambliss relied almost exclusively on circumstantial evidence, most cases, including past civil rights
crimes, require and involve both circumstantial and direct
evidence.47 For instance, Alabama prosecutors used circumstantial evidence ofthe defendant's conflicting statements, which placed him at the crime scene at the approximate time of the homicide. 48 The prosecution also
presented direct evidence that the murder weapon was
observed in the defendant's home prior to the crime.

Iv. Conviction Standards & Appellate Review

From almost day one in criminal law class (or by
watching The Practice or Law & Order), law students
learn that in a criminal trial the prosecution has the burden
of persuasion as to every element ofthe case.49 The Court
of Special Appeals ofMaryland has held that a judge must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution when determining whether the prosecution has
established aprimaJacie case. 50 The general standard
of proof for a criminal conviction is beliefbeyond a reasonable doubt. 51 That standard applies to the three types
of evidentiary scenarios mentioned supra.
As the Chambliss case demonstrated, rarely, however, does the process oflitigating civil rights crimes end
at the trial court stage; appellate courts often weigh in.
34.2 U. Bait L.F. 6

Appellate courts have upheld convictions ifthe direct and
circumstantial evidence supported rational inferences from
which the trier of fact could have been convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt ofthe essential elements ofthe crime. 52
However, federal and state case law dictates that convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence are also subject to other standards. 53 The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland has stated that inferences of circumstantial
evidence must be inconsistent with any theory of innocence.54 When considering the evidence, a conviction may
be achieved even if there is a weak link in the chain of
custody, meaning not every link ofthe chain needs to reach
the reasonable doubt standard. 55 The culmination of evidence, however, must reach the reasonable doubt standard. 56
If the evidence presented does not counter all theories of innocence there is a "mere suspicion" of the
defendant's guilt. 57 Both federal and state case law hold
that a "mere suspicion" of guilt cannot lead to a conviction.58 Since the "mere suspicion" standard is subjective,
case law is inconsistent with regard to convictions and
acquittals. Cases resulting in acquittals with seemingly
strong evidence to the contrary include one in which the
defendant was seen away from the scene shortly after the
crime occurred. 59 In another case, a defendant's presence in a room where a theft occurred was not strong
enough evidence to meet the "mere suspicion" standard
because others had access to the area. 60
The discussion, supra, assumes, naturally, that a prosecutor is able to build a case for trial to satisfy these standards for conviction. In cases of past civil rights crimes,
however, that assumption is difficult to realize. Indeed,
piecing together the prosecution ofa past civil rights crimes
is in and ofitself a difficult endeavor.

V. Litigation Problems
Although circumstantial evidence may result in (or
sustain) criminal convictions, evidentiary problems may
arise while gathering evidence for cases years after the
crimes occurred. Such problems include the admission of
out-of-court statements, which may include statements
from dead or lost witnesses, and racially sensitive evidence.
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Another problem is the possibility that evidence has been
lost in the intervening years.

objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial. "75

The issue ofthe admissibility of out-of-court statements is significant, if not crucial, in the context of past
civil rights crimes. It is well recognized that out-of-court
statements of witnesses may not be admissible hearsay if
they are made long after the crimes occurred and are not
subjectto cross-examination. 61 However, United States
Supreme Court precedent and the Maryland Rules of
Evidence (Rules) provide exceptions. In Williamson v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that out-of-court
statements are admissible through hearsay exceptions. 62
In Maryland, some exceptions include: (l) present sense
impressions;63 (2) excited utterances;64 (3) statements of
then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition;65
(4) former testimony;66 (5) statement under belief of impending death;67 (6) statement against interest;68 and
(7) statement of personal or family history.69 Indeed, in
the 1994 prosecution ofMedgar Evers, killed in 1963,
the Mississippi Supreme Court relied on a former testimony exception to allow a transcript of an unavailable
witness into evidence because the witness had been crossexamined during previous testimony.70

Aside from the devastating effect Crawford may
have on the prosecution of child molesters,76 it may severely limit the breadth of available evidence against defendants in civil rights cases. Indeed, statements made to
police officers or prosecuting offices years ago may not
be admissible if the witness is now dead or is otherwise
unavailable to testify.

Past civil rights crimes prosecuted today, however,
must overcome yet another evidence law burden - the
landmark Crawford v. Washington decision.71 There,
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 7-2 majority, concluded that based on the Framers' understanding of the
Sixth Amendment confrontation right, testimonial statements of a witness absent from trial are admissible only
where the witness is unavailable, and only where the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.72 Justice Scalia emphasized that the history ofthe Confrontation Clause supports two principles: (l) the principal evil
at which the Clause was directed was the civil law mode
of criminal procedure, particularly the use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused,73 and (2)
the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial
unless he was unavailable to testify and the defendant had
a prior opportunity to for cross-examination.74 An extrajudicial statement is testimonial in nature ifthe statement
was made "undt:r cin:umstances which would lead an

As if Crawford is not in and of itself an unmovable
hurdle, lost evidence may be. 77 However, pursuant to the
Rules the previous existence of lost evidence may be
proved through authenticated public records describing
the evidence. 78 Also, a copy of a lost transcript may be
admitted ifauthenticated. 79
Naturally, the prosecution of civil rights crimes often
includes racially sensitive evidence, ranging from evidence
showing racial prejudice of the defendant to evidence
showing membership in traditional racist organizations. 80
Rule 5-403 permits the admission of relevant evidence
unless it is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

VI. Beyond the Law: The Politics of
Prosecuting Past Civil Rights Cases
In the media age, polls drive campaigns and government action. True, there are some politicians with the
courage and conviction to do what is right regardless of
the political consequences. Yet, more and more, as the
Karl Roves and James Carvilles ofAmerica drive the political decision-making process, major decisions must first
be politically correct. Prosecuting past civil rights cases is
not an exception to this prevailing trend. Today, these
cases benefit from a more favorable political environment.
"Before Emmett Till's murder, I had known the fear
of hunger, hell and the Devil. But now there was a new
fear known to me - the fear of being killed just because I
was black," wrote Mississippi civil rights activist Ann
Moody.81 Emmett Till was a fourteen-year-old from the
South Side of Chicago visiting his relatives near Money,
Mississippi. 82 Joined by his cousin, Emmett met up with
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some other black children outside Bryant's Grocery and
Meat Market. 83 Outside ofthe store, Emmett showed off
a picture of a white girl who was a friend of his in Chicago. 84 One of the boys told Emmett, "Hey, there's a
[white] girl in that store there. I bet you won't go in there
and talk to her. "85 Emmett took up the dare and went into
the store. As he left, he told the woman, "Bye, Baby."86
A few days later that woman's husband, Roy Bryant, returned from a truckingjob. 87 The woman told her husband about the incident in the grocery store. In response,
he and his brother-in-law, 1.W. Milam, took Emmett from
his cousin's home and killed him. 88 Emmett was tortured
with a metal fan that crushed his face and then he was
dumped into the Tallahatchie River with a noose ofbarbed
wire. 89 Neither man was convicted of a crime.90 As Chicago Sun-Times writer Mary Mitchell noted, "No onenot a judge or jury - would dare convict the men who
meted out the punishment.''91
It has taken this nation, and Mississippi, forty-nine
years to resurrect this case. Recently, Senator Charles
Schumer (D-New York) and Congressman Charles
Rangel (D-New York) urged the federal government to
re-examine the 1955 murder ofEmmett. 92 On May 10,
2004, the United States Department of Justice and the
Leflore County district attorney announced that they would
reopen the case, which was prompted largely by two documentaries that claim the crime involved as many as ten
people, not just the two men acquitted. 93
VII. Conclusion
Prosecuting past civil rights crimes draws immediate
media attention. The recent Till case developments and
the 2002 prosecution of a York, Pennsylvania mayor for
the 1969 race-riot murder of a young black woman are
merely some examples. 94 These cases, these moments of
past sin and the failings of our criminal justice system, are
instant dramas. Yet, for prosecutors, these cases may be
among the most important tests oftheir respective careers,
both legally and politically. America has moved faster,
and stronger than most nations in addressing a history of
violence and injustice. We still have further to go. Another step in the direction ofhealing is to open these cases,
try these cases - should the evidence to prosecute exist34.2 U. Bait L.F. 8

and ensure that justice is served.
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